

HP +

A thoughtful and  
well documented discussion

The relation between state, world history and  
religion in Hegel's Encyclopedia.

-----

Matthias E. STORME

Philosophy 457b

Prof. J.E. SMITH.

May 1982.

562

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I. The relation between state, world history and religion seen from the state.

- A. The state on itself and as highest form of Sittlichkeit. p.3
- B. The state coming into relation with world history p.4
- C. The state in relation to religion and absolute spirit p.5

Chapter II. The relation between state, world history and religion seen from world history.

- A. World history on itself p.8
- B. World history in its relation to the state p.11
- C. World history in relation to religion and absolute spirit p.12

Chapter III. The relation between state, world history and religion seen from religion.

- A. Religion on itself p.14
- B. Religion in relation with the state p.18
- C? Religion in relation to world history p.23

Bibliography p.25

Chapter I. The relation between state, world history and religion seen from the state.

A. The state on itself and as highest form of ethiccity (Sittlichkeit).

The state is the self-conscious ethical substance, in which the former figures of objective spirit are united (Enz. 535). In relation to morality can be said that freedom is only given as a task on the level of morality, whereas it is first realized in the production of freedom through its own activity in the figures of ethiccity. These three figures, the family, the civil society and the state are the development and realization of ethiccity and purify it of subjective opinion and desire (Enz. 552). Ethiccity, and especially the state as its highest form, gives a body to moral intentions and aspirations. The family and the civil society are enlisted in the state as a community which prevents their disintegration.

The freedom, given as a task - a task of self-liberation- is realized in the state in a certain form. This is not a limitation of freedom, but of subjective will, because it makes freedom first possible. (Phil. Gesch. p. 58).

This state has a constitution (Verfassung) by which it lives and has reality. The first determination of the state involved in its constitution is a distinction between the rulers and the ruled, the commanders and the obedient (Phil. Gesch. p. 62-63).

*Are who obey*

The state with its constitution is the incarnation and realization of the spirit (still objective spirit), which is on this level a 'national spirit' (Volksgeist). The national spirit is, as it were, the soul of the state, and the state the body of the national spirit. As such, it is the expression of the total spirit of a nation, and contains also its art, religion and philosophy. As they are also considered figures of absolute spirit, transcending objective spirit and the state, this relation will have to be clarified.

They find their locus within the state, but they also transcend it because they are expressions of Absolute Spirit

B. The state coming into relation with world history.

The state on itself expresses the internal sovereignty of the state, But <sup>the states</sup> they also have external sovereignty. As each state is absolutely sovereign, there is no direct mediation between them. The possibility of legal relationships between different states presupposes the possibility of war, of conflict between them (Ahngern p. 244). A relation between different states is an extension of space, seen from the standpoint of a state. International law then stays a merely external relation between states and does not provide a highest judge above them; there is no realized world community as a world tribunal outside the states. (Ahngern p.245). Thus, from the point of view of a state, there can be no higher law, and a state acts in its own right. We <sup>have yet to</sup> will still see how this is linked with Hegel's conception of there being only one state - in the full sense - at a given time. In any case, conflicts between states arise in time and are decided only in time, i.e. in

world history. Wars will decide upon their right, and world history is the tribunal.

War is seen by Hegel as a creative force, although a negative one. War is the dialectic, i.e. negative moment which sets the states into movement and into relation with each other. Only through this negative moment ( the middle section on state and history, Enz. 547) states (can) be enlisted in the dialectic of world history. This third moment of the state is its temporal extension and limitation ( cfr., Chapter II).

### C. The state in relation to religion and absolute spirit.

As has been said in Enz. 552, the subsequent figures of ethnicity, and especially the state, purify it of subjective opinion. This has to be kept in mind while reading the Anmerkung of Rechtsphil. 270. This paragraph gives a rather clear primacy to the state over religion. However, as Hegel explains in a Zusatz (p. 229), in this book the principle of the state is carried through in its proper domain following its Idea, and on the other hand religion is not dealt with qua true religion in this paragraph. It is rather so that only the subjective and material aspects of religion are in view here. The application of the principles of the state <sup>to</sup> on religion is more specifically determined in the following issues:

- subjective religious opinions (Meinungen) can have no precedence over the reality as it is mediated and elaborated by the whole of humanity , nl.

the state. This primacy of the state expresses only the primacy of the whole over the individual, of the objective spirit over the not yet purified subjective spirit.

- the state has the right to apply its laws also to subjects having a religion which does not recognize the duties towards the state. However, the appropriate attitude of the state in such cases is tolerance - which means no recognition of the claims of such sects -.
- further, there is the right of the state to apply its laws in material and exterior affairs of the church and religious institutions: they are treated as private persons. This is the more true because it is the duty and task of the state to protect religion with such civil laws. Thus they are enlisted in the legal and protectional system of the state.



Do you mean the religions?

There are also relations between state and religion on the level of objective spirit. The state is the self-consciousness of the unity of subjective and objective spirit (Phil. Gesch. p.64). Religion then is as well a figure of objective spirit as of absolute spirit (Ahngern 286). In <sup>their</sup> its figures (Gestalten), religion, art and philosophy are inseparably united with the figure (Gestalt) of the state. 'In their figures' means : in their historical forms. Religion, art and philosophy still have more self-consciousness of the unity of objective and subjective spirit than the state, but on that level they have

Very important

less reality. They exist on the ground of the state. Thus the state can be said to be the unity of constitution (Verfassung) and the religion, art and philosophy of a nation, i.e. in their historical forms. (cfr. Phil. Gesch. p. 64). As such, they form part of the national spirit which is only realized through the state.

In its ground, Hegels state is itself religious. It is engaged in the progressive realization of Gods kingdom on earth (NIEL p. 284). It is the last form of historical community before the coming of Gods kingdom. It is the divine Idea insofar as it is present on earth (Phil. Gesch. p. 56). And, as will be seen, it is in fact the only complete success of Hegel's logic in this world (cfr. Enz. 198), <sup>although</sup> even when this success takes only place on the level of objective spirit. ( cfr. BRUAIRE p. 168).

Good - This point is often overlooked

But the reality of the state remains finite. And finitude means for Hegel a disproportion, a non-coincidence of its reality to the Concept (ANGEHRN p. 156). The state is precisely finite because the objectivity of objective spirit remains a posited objectivity. This is elaborated in the Zusatz of Enz. 386.

At this moment, the relationship between state and religion remains ambiguous. On the one hand, religion forms the ground of the state; it even founds the unity of a nation in the first place (SCHEIT p. 232); on the other hand, the state is the body and existence of religion, its first reality. But as grounded in religion in a double and ambiguous sense, the sta-

te is only true and valid in so far as it can be subsumed under absolute spirit (religion). Thus, we will have to clear the ambiguity once we have reached the standpoint of religion (cfr. Chapter III).

Chapter II. The relation between state, world history and religion seen from world history.

A. World history on itself.

World history is the course of progress in the consciousness of freedom (Phil. Gesch. p. 32) and the factual carrying out of freedom (ANGEHRN p. 245). Its final end thus is the complete consciousness by spirit of its freedom and the reality of its freedom. This forms the spirit on the level of world spirit (Weltgeist), an explanation and realization of the universal spirit (cfr; Rechtsphil. 342).

World history proceeds and develops in different moments. Within those moments of the totality, everything particular finds its place. Hegel distinguishes, as usual, three moments.

1. The first moment of world history is the abstract principle of freedom, derived from the religious consciousness of the freedom of all men. As abstract, it is not yet realized, not yet concrete.

2. The second or dialectical moment sets the movement going (ins Werk setzen), by the activity of the will (cfr; Phil. Gesch. p. 36). This activity is however a subjective activity. The movement needs subjective wants, drives, passions and proclivities.

' because nothing takes place without the interest of those who co-operate by their activity ' (Phil. Gesch. p. 37). The dialectic needs this negative moment. History thus is not only the domain of freedom, but also the domain of fallenness, of sin. ( cfr. NIEL p. 300).

But individual interests are only seemingly the subjects of world history, while in reality, they are constituted in such a way that they can be an instrument of reason. It is by falling into this negative moment that freedom can be received in the dialectical process of reason.

3. The third moment of world history then is the consciousness of the freedom of all men as it is realized in the world (i.e. institutionalized). In this moment, the subjective activity is transformed into an objectivity. Through a long struggle, the first two moments ( abstract freedom and subjective activity) are united in a concrete freedom, and this happens only in the state. The particular interests are limited in their use ( compare the transition from civil society to the state)( Phil. Gesch. p.42) in order to let common ends be realized - a heterogenesis of ends -. By this transformation, the result of an individual action no longer coincides with the intention of its author, but turns against the author. This way in which particular interests are used as instruments for higher purposes, Hegel calls the cunning of reason (cfr. Phil. Gesch. p.49).

Two important things arise in this third moment:

*The cunning of Reason*



*This is present in Stage 2*

The first is that the state, and not the individual action, is the real subject of world history. This relationship will be elaborated in B. of this chapter.

Secondly, world history is guided by reason, which is not its real subject, but stays untouched in the background (Phil. Gesch. p. 49). World history has as it were a dimension out of time. The relation between reason in and out of temporal history is examined more in C. of this chapter. But its working in world history first has to be characterised more.

Enz. 549 states first that world history has an absolute final end. Its absolute end is that <sup>which</sup> what is realized progressively in history. History thus has no end outside itself (NIEL p. 299).

Secondly, reason in history is identified with divine providence. The world is governed by divine providence, i.e. wisdom with infinite power realizing the absolute final end, and this providence is determined as plan. (Phil. Gesch. p. 25). World history is the execution of God's government, of his plan in the world (Phil. Gesch. p. 53).

Hegel insists that we can and have to know the ways, means and phenomena of divine providence. This is ultimately possible because and only because God has revealed himself. This however can only be clarified in the philosophy of religion (cfr. Chapter III).

B. World history in its relation to the state.

B. of the first chapter explained how states can come into <sup>reality</sup> relation with world history; through problems of spatial extension, they get involved in conflicts which only are solved in the course of history, in the course of time.

Enz. 536 states that the state is only a moment in the development of the universal Idea of the spirit in its reality, i.e. the world history. And indeed, the external law of the state (auszere Staatsrecht) which made them conflict (namely, the external sovereignty of the state) is 'aufgehoben' when the states are received into the dialectic of world history. World history is described by Hegel as this dialectic of national spirits (Volksgeister), who are incarnated in states (Enz. 548). As a dialectic, it is a process in which the arising and perishing (going under) of national spirits take place (ANGEHRN p.246).

*Untergang*

Not only is history moved by conflicts between states, but states are also the only subjects or individuals of world history. A nation becomes only historical when its national spirit is incarnated in a state, when it builds a state. Only a state gives history to a nation (Volk), because Reason has an objective existence in the state (cfr Phil. Gesch; p.56). Nations without state have no right to participate in world history, because they have not yet found the realization of their right.

*Without the form of the state it would seem to be impossible for nations to take part in world history*

When the formation of a state is the realization of a right in history, and history the process of conflicting rights, it can only be the transition from one state and national spirit to another. History is considered as the world tribunal (Weltgericht): it is the last facticity, and legal claims against the course of history are pure pedantry (ANGEHRN p. 245). This world tribunal can only solve the conflicts because the states are not equal. There can only be one state at a time, and when two of them conflict, it is one which arises and another which is perishing. History is thus the process of transition from one state to another.

This dialectic of states alternating with each other allows a clear relation between the state and world history. Every state is the only one at his time, and the national spirit it expresses is itself the expression of the world spirit in that time. Within its time, a national spirit is absolute, is the highest already realized form of the world spirit and of the spirit as such. However, it is subordinated in a more universal temporal horizon above which states come up and under which they go down.

World history is then for Hegel a progressive realization of freedom in four succeeding states (cfr. Rechtsphil. 353):

1. the oriental state as an identity in which individuality gets absorbed and lost;
2. the greek state with its ethical subjectivity;
3. the roman empire with its abstract universality;
4. the germanic state, receiving truth and concrete

*I take this to mean that at any given time there is a dominant state subject to destiny and the judgment of history.*

Good point -  
The position becomes  
tripartite in the  
formula -  
No one is free;  
Some are free;  
all are free;

essence in interiority, where the spirit is at home and reconciled with objectivity.

It is remarkable how, in this most empiric part of Hegels philosophy, nl. the philosophy of history, there is no triade, but a fourfold structure. There are some indications that a fourfold structure could clear op some of the ambiguities left in Hegels dialectic of triades, but this would lead us to far from our subject here.

C. World history in relation to religion and absolute spirit.

Everything particular finds it place as a moment of world history. It contains the whole spiritual reality (Rechtsphil. 341), is the last complete reality of the spirit. This means that art, religion and philosophy are not a complete realization, and that the historical truth is always the highest realization of truth at a certain moment. In that sense, absolute truth is always contemporary (cfr. FINDLAY p. 335).

In stripping off the limitations of the particular national spirits, the spirit becomes a concrete universality, i.e. absolute spirit (Enz. 552).

It is precisely because everything has its place in world history, that it can form the transition towards absolute spirit (cfr. Rechtsphil. 344-345). However, the relation between world history and absolute spirit still remains unclear; on the one hand divine providence does not take place outside, but

Good

in history - Hegel has rationalized the idea of divine providence by the idea of mediation, says NIEL (p. 299) -, on the other hand, as factual carrying out of freedom -the process of (self)liberation - , world history does refer to something transcending it : freedom in its pure representation, which is the last foundation of the whole system. It is through its mediation that world history <sup>overcomes</sup> relifts the limitation and finitude of the objective spirit. All forms of objective spirit can only be understood on the ground of an absolute form of history (Geschehen), namely liberation (ANGEHRN p. 285 ff.). World history is thus enlisted in an absolute history which confers sense to it. But the relation between world history and absolute - timeless ? - history can only be understood when the transcendence of religion is clarified (cfr. infra, Chapter III).

Chapter III. The relation between state, world history and religion seen from religion.

A. Religion on itself.

Religion is the absolute truth, the spirit in which subjectivity and objectivity are reconciled as spirit. It is the realization of this reconciliation. However, how this happens can best be explained by distinguishing two sides of religion, of which the different moments are gradually mediated and merged together. One side is the religious consciousness of men, the growing consciousness of this unity, transcending the objective spirit qua level of consciousness. The other

side is the absolute spirit itself, or God as absolute Idea, absolute knowledge which is its own reality. Both sides are the reverse of the other, and their unity as possible through revelation. The revelation of the spirit by itself as absolute spirit is the caesura between the true or revealed religion and all former figures of spirit, objective spirit, art and other religions. Only through revelation, <sup>does</sup> religion transcend them.

The becoming of religious consciousness takes place in three moments, corresponding to three moments of the process of self-manifestation and self-withdrawal of the absolute spirit or three divine persons, who themselves take up and repeat the total process of spirit. We will indicate in the following those moments and the corresponding reigns of the divine persons.

1. The first moment of religious consciousness is the subjective moment : religion on the level of feeling and representation. This is more or less the level of art. God is still the entirely Different, and represented as an absolute power (sovereign spirit) (ANGEHRN p.339), i.e. the other in which the finite is absorbed. But the spirit as self-affirmation participates in this absolute spirit, which is here the reign of the Father.
2. The second moment of religious consciousness is a more objective moment. The level of feeling and representation is transcended by devotion (Andacht) in practice or cult. Religion here arises to a practical way of dealing with the relations between finite and infinite. In this acts I become conscious of the unity between God and man: God is in me and I in him.

The cult as unity of inward action (devotion) and outward action (ritual) asks for a realization of the spirit of the religious community in the outward reality. It is already a participation in the eternal procession of the word of God through the church. Freedom appears as not merely human freedom, but as human freedom in unity with divine freedom (NIEL p. 331). It is an anticipative realization of this unity, of the total reality of the Idea.

This is only possible because of the revelation of God by himself, namely its incarnation. The God-mén Christ provides the lacking moment for the application of the concept of absolute spirit, gives the turn which inaugurates the reign of the Son. (cfr. Theunissen p.13). In revelation continued in cult as participation in the word, the relation between finite man and the absolute is reversed - the finite subject can not apprehend the absolute spirit out of itself - and the historical actualization of human freedom is continued.-the Incarnation is a historical event-. (cfr ANGEHRN p. 333 ff.). In the reign of the Son, absolute spirit is not only absolute power, but also self-manifestation of itself as the truth of power. In the revelation of the truth, its realization is already anticipated. Now, the finite spirit can be received in the infinite spirit.

3. In the third moment, the religious consciousness is the spirit of God itself (the Holy Spirit), acting in the faithful and testifying towards itself: the reign of the Spirit in unity with the religious community (Gemeinde) based on faith,

*This is the reason  
that he calls the  
incarnation  
necessary*

and knowing itself in its faith. The faith of the religious community anticipates in an absolute way the realization of eternity, as this realization was already revealed in the incarnation.

For the lutheran church, this participation in the reign of the spirit is a return to one's own heart to find God there as already present. The community is based on the common faith, the participation in the spirit as third divine person (cfr. SMITH). Christ is only spiritually present in this community - cfr. Hegels explanation about the Host being only divine in the destruction of its exterior, Enz 552 p. 357 -, whereas in the catholic church, the church is also the continuation of the body of Christ (SMITH p. 159) in which the spirit becomes present and thus at the same moment also realized in the external world. For Hegel, in the protestant tradition, the Incarnation stops however with the individual Christ (NIEL p. 353). Therefore, there remains a separation between the religious consciousness and its realization in the reign of God, a separation between the spiritual community and God himself. Luther stripped religion of its divine nearness. A certain Sehnsucht is the result. This leads us to an unpronounced dialectic in Hegel, with which will be dealt in B. of this chapter.

*This seems paradoxical  
Does it not in view  
of Luther's  
Crisis of  
Certain forms  
of mediation?*

B. Religion in relation with the state.

At first sight, the relation between state and religion can be explained easily. Religion is a figure of absolute spirit, transcending objective spirit and thus also its highest form, the state. But in C. of chapter I, the relation appeared to be more ambiguous. And in A. of this chapter, even more difficulties appeared.

True religion is the substantiality of ethicity, which is the substance of the state. Religion is the ground of the state, as well in history as in substance : religion founds the unity of a nation through its representation of God. The state developed out of religion, but has it therefore transcended religion, ?

True religion is consciousness of God as free spirit, of the absolute truth. It is ethicity - and the state - precisely as consciousness of the free universality of its concrete essence (Enz. 552, p. 354-355). Freedom not only has to be realized in objectivity ( namely state and world history), but also has to become conscious of itself in art, religion and philosophy. Therefore, politics is subordinated to religion - the reign of Love -, has to be subsumed under it, but religion realizes itself only in political form. How has this correlation to be thought ?

The state is true reality (Theunissen p. 87), but also self-conscious reality; it knows itself and fulfills itself in so far as it knows what it is. (cfr. Rechtsphil. 257). It is a reality to which also knowledge appertains. Religion is true knowledge (Wissen), but also real knowledge : religion

Good

is realized in cult. It is knowledge to which also : reality appertains, but also knowledge transcending the world. State and religion are the reverse side of each other. Religion is the ground of the state and as such abstract, the state is the determined content of religion and thus a real figure, an existence (Rechtsphil. 270 Anm.).

The following could indicate a solution: when the state is a reality already given, ( Gegebenes), religion is something 'Aufgegebenes', given up as a task, and precisely the political realization of christianity - the true religion - is given up as a task by religion. This is the core of our final conclusion about the relation between state and religion, but before stating it, the possibilities of realization and thus of a reconciliation between both have to be examined.

There seems to be hidden a certain dialectic in Hegel's philosophy of religion, which is connected with the difficulties of realizing the protestant spiritual community. (cfr. supra A. of this chapter). We have indicated how the true religion was working on two levels: the level of cult ( reign of the Son) and the level of faith ( reign of the Spirit). Where the catholic church is in Hegel's opinion stuck on the level of cult in its purely external forms, the protestant spiritual community based on faith should yield the ultimate reconciliation. However, following the lutheran doctrine, the spirit only becomes absolute in the destruction of its interior together with the common faith of the religious community (Enz. 552

This is, I believe, the key and the question that arises is how can the interior become the basis of the state and be actualized in other than any form and conscience (which are clearly not organizational forms)

p. 357). But this reconciliation in the interiority is again purely abstract, because what has to be reconciled is the world (SCHEIT p.228). The reconciliation between God and world has to unfold and display itself in the total reality ! The spiritual community is only fulfilled in ending the separation between self-consciousness and outward reality (SCHEIT p.229). But this fulfilled is not what happens in the lutheran community ! Hegel is certainly not blind for this, and the concluding pages of his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion thus strike a 'discordant note' (SMITH p. 157). (cfr. Phil. Rel. II p. 342-343). Hegel declares that in reality, there is rather a rupture between religion and its realization, as well as between religion and philosophy -which should be its ultimate expression -. The common faith is perishing because of a radical thought, completely detached from the world. The unity between interior and exterior is no longer present (ANGEHRN p. 375). And Hegel exclaims : in faith, nothing is justified !

How then, can the reconciliation of the spiritual community and the real world take place?

First of all, Hegel rejects the calvinistic way which separates completely the exterior, domain of the state, and the interior, domain of faith. (This makes the separation only worse). (BRUAIRE p. 163-164).

A second solution, a return to a well-understood catholicism, is however unthinkable for Hegel (id.

after all, Calvinism could think in terms of Thomism and there is no separation there

I would have thought that the separation is greater in Lutheran

p.161). This is clearly stated in Enz. 552. In a little footnote however ( to Rechtsphil. 141 Zusatz), an interesting indication is given. The text deals with the transition from morality (interiority) to ethicity (realization of freedom), defended by Hegel. This transition is compared with the return of lots of protestants, nostalgic for an objectivity, to avoid the trouble of emptyness and negativity, to the catholic church. Although this is condemned by Hegel, he gives no explanation for what difference there would be with the transition from morality to ethicity (Sittlichkeit). It shows that true giving of content can not occur at the level of inwardness, but demands concrete organization.

The only solution left then after the failure of the lutheran spiritual community, is a state which can give the necessary incarnation to the inward lutheran religion and stay in harmony with it (cfr. BRUAIRE 162-163). It is the universal state which realizes the task given to the first christian community, the task of reconciliation; it constitutes a universal community which makes possible the reign of God. (BRUAIRE, p.164-165). As Hegel writes, it is in the organization of the state that the divine has broken into actuality (SMITH p. 170-171).

A problem with the universal state however, is that the laws of the political authority are valid as Gods laws in so far and only in so far as the monarch knows what the state essentially is; but fol-

*There is another paradox - the religion that is to be the basis of the state ends by becoming a state religion*

lowing the protestant doctrine of universal priesthood, he doesn't know more about it than his subjects (cfr. Phil. Rel. II p. 259 f.). This results in conflicts. The unpronounced solution leads is to a certain decisionism ; the decision is more important than its content. It shows moreover that the lutheran church cannot be the model for the structure of the state. (SCHEIT p. 258).

And indeed, just as the civil society did not provide for the necessary unity of will and self-consciousness and needs a transition into the state as selfconscious social substance (cfr. Enz. 535), the doctrine of universal priesthood does not provide the structure of authority for the universal state. In so far as Hegel has described the structure of his universal state, it is then more structured as the catholic church (cfr. indications in BRUAIRE 165-167, SCHEIT p. 262-264, THEUNISSEN p.445). The Hegelian state is described in the Rechtsphil. as a constitutional monarchy, because only such a monarch can, like the pope, ~~can~~ render the power of a personal God. Another feature of political theology is the king's right to pardon as secularisation of Christ's power to forgive sins, continued in the pontifical authority. Hegel's state is also structured as a whole articulated in particular circles (Rechtsphil. 310) in an organic and hierarchic way, and with a ' universal class ', comparable to the priesthood and ecclesiastical hierarchy of the catholic church.

What can we conclude from this concerning the relation between religion and the state? The true reli-

gion has to be realized in the ideal state. It then transcends the ideal state only in so far as this state is not yet realized. We can maybe conclude with the distinction of NIEL (p. 292): the state in so far as the finitude of the individual is transcended in reality, but religion indicates the sense ( meaning and direction) of all finite actions, by showing that transcendence took in fact already place -through the incarnation-. Religion then as anticipation of this complete reality is a task given to the state (Aufgegebenes). It has to restore within the state the consciousness that concrete freedom of the state is an incarnation of freedom in itself (ANGEHRN p. 288).

Between religion and the state, there is the same dialectic as expressed in Hegel's:

Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich;  
und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.

C. Religion in relation to world history.

Spirit and history are identical for Hegel. But is absolute spirit the same as world history ?

Spirit is a process of self-manifestation and self-withdrawal: it hides and reveals itself and takes itself back. (cfr. THEUNISSEN p.61). Spirit reveals or manifests itself into history; descends into history and thus obtains a positive content. But this process of the Absolute forms a timeless history, which transcends the Totality, expressed in world history (history in time), the realization of God's kingdom on earth. Both form together the

yes

divine history.

The process of self-manifestation and self-withdrawal of the absolute provides the triadic scheme for history. History is the dialectical part, the becoming of the eternal. Spirit has only reality in its revelation through history.

Liebruck called world spirit the shining of absolute spirit in the concealment of history ( scheinen, cfr; Erscheinung) (Kant-Studien 1954-55, p.261).

We can then distinguish different degrees of history. The power of an action over history is then in proportion to the mediatedness of the action : the actun of an individual, the most immediate, is the least powerful; then follows the activity of a national spirit; then the activity of world spirit; and finally the activity of world spirit (the power over history as forming eternal or timeless history) (THEUNISSEN p.72). Mediation remains the key word in Hegel's philsofhy of history. But how does this explain the transcendence of Absolute spirit above world history ? How can this tñanscendence be reconciled with the principle of mediation ?

Good

In the opinion of NIEL (p.315), Hegel should recognize that reason is not able to explain this last transition by mediation. Above all mediation, a non mediatable immedáate should be posited. And THEUNISSEN (p.447) notices that the complete rationality of God is compensated by a decisionistic element in the power of the monarch in the state. Medâation has to bring God on earth, but when mediation fails (cfr. B. of this chapter), the separation rests and the real usurps God's place. Is it not in fact the development of Hegelianism in its left wing that has finally lead to the death of God ?

Yes

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

- E. ANGEHRN, Freiheit und System bei Hegel, W. de Gruyter Berlin-N.Y. 1977.
- C. BRUAIRE, Logique et religion chrétienne dans la philosophie de Hegel, Le Seuil Paris 1964
- J.N. FINDLAY, Hegel, a re-examination, Allen & Unwin London 1958.
- G.W.F. HEGEL, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Berlin <sup>1</sup>1821, Ed. H. REICHELDT, Ullstein Frankfurt.
- id., Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Berlin <sup>3</sup>1830, 3. Teil, Die Philosophie des Geistes, Suhrkamp 1970.
- id., Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Ed. K. HEGEL, 1840, Suhrkamp 1970;
- id., Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Jubiläumausgabe, vol. I and II.
- H. NIEL, De la médiation dans la philosophie de Hegel, Aubier-Montagne Paris 1945.
- H. SCHEIT, Geist und Gemeinde, zum Verhältnis von Religion und Politik bei Hegel, Epimeleia Band 21, Pustet München-Salzburg 1973.
- J.E. SMITH, Hegel's reinterpretation of the doctrine of spirit and the religious community, in: Hegel and the philosophy of religion, the Wofford symposium, Ed. D.E. CHRISTENSEN, M. Nijhoff Den Haag 1970.
- M. THEUNISSEN, Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat, W. de Gruyter Berlin 1970.