

On circles in "Being and Time".

I liked this paper.
Its most obvious weakness is that it covers much too much. As a result the circles in BT are not worked out as carefully as one should like. But what you have to say is thoughtful + sensible.

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First Chapter - Introductory Chapter.

A. The question of Being.;

Being and Time intends to repeat (wiederholen) the question of Being. It questions the being as to its Being, asking for the meaning of Being. This question is the one forgotten in philosophy, where Being is considered as the gathering of all beings, as the most general and thus emptiest concept, which can be applied to everything and has no meaning of its own. In the tradition of metaphysics, Being is a plurivocal concept, which can be applied by analogy to beings (a univocal concept). This is at least the traditional interpretation of *τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται*. For Heidegger however, Being is not evident, and the question why there is Being and not rather nothing, continues to bother him. He wants to transform the questioning by reading this sentence of Aristotle later in a different way as "Das Seiende wird hinsichtlich seiner Seins in vielfacher Weise offenkundig" (Heidegger's preface to RICHARDSON, p. XI). He wants to give an account of Being as the fullest idea, as a univocal idea, whereas beings can be plurivocal, according to different possible relations towards Being. But then, Being can only be thought through a certain approximation and display (unfolding). And this display can be thought as a topology of Being. (cfr; SCHERER & KELKEL p. 47).

(°)The meaning of Being is its unity within the plurality of beings.

Heidegger uses such a topological vocabulary already in Being and Time : region (Gegend, Ort), clearing (Lichtung), nearness or neighbourhood (Nähe). It also resounds in disclosure (Erschlossenheit) or fallenness (Verfallen).

The question of Being itself is developed with this words. Heidegger explains the formal structure of this question as a searching (par. 2, p.5 f.). The question has to be set out (erörtern) - in the German word we still hear the search for the place or 'Ort' of this question -. As search, it moves always already around in a certain understanding of Being : it is situated in a certain region (Gegend) which surrounds. These surroundings form the circle in which the understanding of Being takes place. But this circle is not yet a clearing, and this understanding is still obscure and vague.

Other circles will follow in Being and Time. The whole book can be said to move around in circles. In what kind of circles is Heidegger moving ? And how does he get in or out of them ? What is the right access and what is man's place in this circularity ? Is this circle the circularity of Being itself ?

B. The circularity of the question of Being : The place of the meaning of Being vs. the place of the analysis of Dasein.

In the same par. 2 giving the formal structure of the question of Being, we encounter the first circle in which the whole of Being and Time (published and unpublished) is moving : the question of Being and its understanding are themselves modi of the being which we are ourselves, called Dasein, and therefore requires first a determination of this being in its Being (SZ p.7). The way of access to Being takes already place in a circle. A vague pre-understanding of Being is the only starting-point on the way to a fuller understanding. On the other hand, the place of Dasein having this first understanding can only fully be understood from the whole, from the meaning of Being itself. A first understanding of Being is the only access to the whole, to a fuller understanding, but to be so, Dasein has to be determined in its relation to the whole, its place has to be found. Dasein has precisely to be analyzed in its relation to Being, or rather, Dasein is the relation to Being of man, his having to be (zu Sein haben), and its analysis is caught in this circle.

The thinking of Being forms such a circle where the whole is already implied from the beginning in every of the being which we are ourselves. This circle is for Heidegger not a vicious circle, but the unfolding, step by step, of what is already foreseen and announcing itself in the situation of Dasein (cfr. SCHERER & KEEKEL p. 47).

This circle of Being is not purely the sum of everything which is, the totality of beings, contained in an external limit, the outline of a circle. The circularity is not an external category, but a characteristic of the disclosure of Being which takes place out of a central place (cfr. SCHERER & KELKEL p. 50). It is then impossible to get out of this circle in order to reach Being itself which is only disclosed in it. Even when Being itself is what is asked for in the quest, it can only be seen from the right access to this circle of disclosure.

And the first access we have is the access which we are ourselves, the place on which we stand always already, the being which we are. Being and Time examines which disclosure of Being can be seen from this place where Dasein is in fact, from this facticity of Dasein. It questions the meaning of Being, its sense, and so the disclosure from this factual place has a certain sense or direction, has to be guided by the directedness towards Being. Dasein thus is questioned in its understanding of Being and as disclosure towards Being. Both characteristics of Dasein, its facticity -its yet being thrown into Being - as a being between others (ontically)-, and its disclosure (Erschlossenheit), can not be separated, but form together one project (Entwurf) or throw which is 'Da'. This unity of Dasein will be a guideline for the development of its analysis.

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Heidegger considers the understanding of Being already present in Dasein as a fact. From this fact, he can trace the circle in which this understanding can be worked out. This circle is the a priori structure of understanding of Being itself. Fundamental ontology is the transcendental project to disclose this a priori structure of understanding. If this circle is an a priori structure, then the problem is not to get out of it, but to find the right access. Being and Time attempts to find this access in the facticity and disclosure of Dasein. This attempt has to be considered as a leap (Sprung) in the nearness (Nähe) of the origin (Ursprung) (cfr. SZ p.315), not as a way or path which gradually leads us into this circle. We can see how this characteristic of Being and Time is somewhat different from Heidegger's later thinking which is thought as a way. At this moment we only want to mark the connection between this starting point of Heidegger's philosophy and a similar starting point in the theology of Karl BARTH, whose commentary on the Epistle to the Romans appeared in 1918 and certainly has influenced Heidegger.

C. The circle of phenomenology.

The way of dealing with the question of Being in Being and Time is the phenomenological one (SZ p.27). Heidegger explains this method in par. 7, and it can be seen how the phenomenological method is apt to fulfill this project of Being and Time.

Heidegger distinguishes 'appearance' in the vulgar sense, as something not showing itself, but through which something that doesn't show itself is announced (das Sich-melden von etwas das sich nicht zeigt, p.29), from 'phenomenon' in the phenomenological sense, as that which shows itself in itself (das Sich-an-ihm- selbst-zeigende) (p.28). That which announces itself in the appearance without being thematic, can thematically be brought to show itself, to become a phenomenological phenomenon. Again, we can proceed from the appearance to the phenomenon, precisely because the phenomenon is already announced in the appearance.

The phenomenon which is announced is the Being of beings, the starting point in which it is announced is the exemplary being. The analysis of this exemplary being has to bring itself before the question of the meaning of Being (p.37 SZ), which is already announced in a certain understanding of Being belonging to this exemplary being. There we have found the same circle in the phenomenological method itself. And this circle can guide us for the structure of the analysis of Dasein itself, which is implied in it.

D. The circularity within the analysis of Dasein:
the place of inauthentic and authentic Dasein on the
way to the meaning of Being.

And indeed, the circle which is already announced in the description of the phenomenological method is fully developed in the analysis of Dasein, forming the first and second section of the first part of Being and Time. Or rather, the circle of Dasein is announced in the first section and completed in the second one. This move takes place in the following way.

Dasein is examined on its relation to Being (Seinsverhältnis), especially its understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis). Dasein is related to Being as having-to-be-its-Being (sein Sein zu sein haben). The possibility of being or not being its own Being is called existence (SZ p. 12), and the unity of the structures which constitute this existence -the existentials- is called the existentiality of Dasein (ibid.). Those structures constituting the constitution of Being (Seinsverfassung) of Dasein are hidden; they are ontically the nearest, ontologically the furthest, but pre-ontologically not totally strange (SZ p.16). Therefore, it is possible to show them, starting from the factual situation of Dasein -its facticity- in which it is first of all and most of the time; the average everydayness of Dasein.

The unfolding of the formal existentials of Dasein can be started from the understanding of the everyday appearances of Dasein, but only because this unfolding

is already started by the idea of existence as a unity and existentiality as the coherence of the formal determinations of Dasein. It is the idea of the whole of Dasein which is already projected, which has to be elucidated and which is guiding the analysis from the beginning.

The first section can then be described as an alternation between the understanding of the appearances of Dasein in which the whole of Dasein is already announced without showing itself in itself, and the understanding of the formal determinations of Dasein who form together the unity in which those appearances are originating (cfr. Fürstenau p. 10-11 & 15). The first section unfolds those different determinations or existentials whereof the unity is already projected. This unity is however not yet fulfilled, and the circle is announced, but not yet completed.

The sixth chapter of the first section is an attempt to bring the existentials together as care, a unity disclosed by the phenomenon of dread.

The second section has to elaborate a structure for this unity, out of which the different existentials can be understood in their place, before the circle can be completed by a return to everydayness with a fuller understanding. Therefore, we have to find the authentic moments of Dasein, the authentic modifications of the existentials which lead us beyond the singular formal determinations, and open up the unity of Dasein.

Through these authentic moments, temporality can be cleared as the horizon for an original interpretation of Dasein. Time is as it were the horizon or the outline of the circle of Dasein. Only when such a horizon is reached, we can go back from authentic Dasein to Dasein in its everydayness in order to understand everyday Dasein out of its origin; out of the authenticity and totality of Dasein (SZ p.17).

Therefore, the second section is a back-and-forth-movement from the existentials (found through everydayness, first section), to the authentic moments elucidated by temporality, and then back to the temporal sense of the everyday moment (cfr. Fürstenaу p.16). It is this 'Wiederholung' on a higher level which has to fulfill the circularity of the analysis of Dasein.

Second chapter - The circles of disclosure.

A. The access to the 'Da' of Dasein.

In this chapter, we will deal with some aspects of the first section of the first part of Being and Time. Its third chapter is the existential analysis of the world. Here, Heidegger makes his distinction between the aspects of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. The a priori structure of the world in which the average everydayness circles around, is that of a purposeful pattern (Bewandtnisganzheit) in which everything is inserted depending upon its being-destined (Bewandtnis). But how do we discover the world as such a pattern ? And how can we leap into this circle of everydayness ?

The readiness-to-hand of things is not thematized in average everydayness, how can it then characterize this everydayness ? Heidegger tries to fulfill the circle in the following way. He considers the view of things as present-at-hand as a reduction, derived from a fuller characterization as readiness-to-hand. In this reduction, we are not presupposing too much, but not enough. It is an attempt to penetrate beyond the clearing and to simplify its a priori structure. But in going beyond this circle, we lose our way. Only through this dislocation, things can be thematized as readiness-to-hand, and become visible as such (cfr. HARRIES p.74). As long as we are in the neighbourhood or nearness (Nähe), within the clearing, readiness-to-hand is not seen

as such. But does the dislocation, the loss of our way, lead us back to the clearing in which it can be seen ? Heidegger then seems to say that this is not the right way, that this isn't the necessary leap into the circle. The discovery of readiness-to-hand takes place by virtue of the view of an already pre-discovered whole. This whole, lighting up for Dasein on the occasion of a disturbance of the order of the whole, is not itself a tool, but rather the 'Da' of Dasein (Richardson p55). The world is an explicitation of this 'Da' of Dasein (Schéerer & Kelkel p. 54). This 'Da' remains undisclosed as long as there is no dislocation ? But do we really disclose the world as purposeful pattern, as a whole of meaningfulness, by returning from presence-at-hand to readiness-to-hand ? How do we find our place and the place of things back ?

These questions are only really answered by Heidegger in 'The origin of the work of art'. It is precisely the work of art which will show us the things in their fullness, in a non-reduced presence. The work of art opens up a world. But this step can only be taken by thematizing the earth, which sustains the world of Being and the clearing, and on its ground, the opened world is set back by the work of art. This is however not yet the solution of Being and Time. Here Heidegger leaps into the 'Da' as disclosure of the world on the ground of the everydayness of Dasein, without having fully explained how the existential constitution of this Da becomes thematized after a dislocation.

B. The Da of Dasein as clearing.

The existential constitution of the Da of Dasein is worked out in par. 29-34 SZ. The basic indications however, are given in par. 28 (SZ p. 132-133). Dasein is always itself its 'Da'. This Da-sein is not a present-at-hand commercium "between" a given subject and object. Such a Da would be an in-between which blasts the unitary phenomenon into a subject and an object. Rather, the Da of Da-sein is a "between", an opening in which the phenomenon can appear in the first place. This gap is the disclosedness of the world itself (Richardson p.58).

Besides the description of Da as the opening in which something appears, Heidegger also uses the light-metapher: Da is the lighting-process itself, that which gives the light in which things can be seen. This 'gap' as well as this 'lighting' of the Da of Dasein are both wonderfully expressed in the word clearing (Lichtung). The da is a clearing opened up in the totality of beings, a nothing in which beings can be disclosed, as it permits the light to enter and thus allows things to be seen (Harries p. 68-69). This clearing in beings is a clearing of Being (Lichtung des Seins) : a disclosedness of Being, opened up by Dasein as an irruption in the totality of beings, by reason of which these beings as beings become manifest (cfr. KM p. 206, cited by Richardson p. 44). Being this Da, Dasein rises up in this clearing out of its thrown essence (geworfen Wesen).

Moreover, a clearing also suggests a circle , within which the light is playing, and a central

place from which different pathways go into the forest - maybe as far as the rays of light can play-, and to which they lead back.

Within this disclosure, Dasein is disclosing in three equally originary constitutive ways of being the Da: disposition, understanding and speech. They are the most originary forms of disclosure, before more specific ways as willing, knowing, receiving (Vernehmen) or expressing (Aussagen). Their range of disclosure is also always more extended than the range of those derivative forms (SZ p.136), which presuppose a specific orientation., a certain pathway, whereas the beams of light are penetrating more evenly through the whole wood.

It is probably not by accident that the disciplines corresponding to those ways of being there, namely rhetoric, dialectic and grammar, formed together the 'trivium' in the 'septem artes liberales'. They are the arts which are not merely acquired, but are essential for a basic human attitude (cfr. GADAMER, Rhetorik und Hermeneutik, p.18).

C. Disposition and understanding.

Disposition (Befindlichkeit) and understanding (Verstehen) are thus two equally originary ways of disclosure. They are also co-relative in a way, worth a certain clarification.

The disposition of Dasein is the originary disclosure (SZ p.134) in which Dasein is given over to Being which it has to be as existence. This being-

Disposition and understanding of Dasein can also be distinguished as the hearing and the seeing, the relation with the listener and the relation with the thing brought up in the openness of the auditory. The disposition can then be clarified as the openness of a forum, a public place or common place in a human community. In this openness, the publicity of being-with-one-another is subjected to different moods (Stimmungen). It is the place where such moods can arise and where the public is given over to the rousing of such moods by orators and rhetoricians (cfr. SZ p. 138 concerning Aristotle's rhetoric). Similarly, the project in which understanding is enlisted, is the basic place (topos) or commonplace where specific 'topoi' or viewpoints can come into play and be played off. Those viewpoints are the thrown possibilities which are handed over by tradition and which we take up to project our own Dasein towards it whereunto and towards the meaningfulness of the world (cfr. 'Wiederholung' in Ch. III). They are only indications for this projecting, possibilities given out as task (aufgegeben) and not merely given as present-at-hand. (cfr. also Pöggeler, *Dialektik und Topik*, p. 303).

Disposition and understanding are thus closely linked together in a text or speech, which is the third equally originary constitutive way of being Da, by which both are equally determined.

given-over-to discloses the facticity or thrownness of Dasein, the Being-in-the-world of Dasein as a totality, and the thrown dependence (Angewiesenheit) upon this world in which it can be handled (cfr. Richardson p. 64-65). The disposition is the general concernedness or involvement in the world within which specific things can concern us and within which we can have different moods.

Understanding is the thrown (geworfen) possibility of Dasein in which it is the projection (Entwurf) towards its whereunto (Worumwillen) and towards the total meaningfulness as Being of its world. Understanding discloses the playground of factual and thrown possibilities of Being of Dasein, the originary view (Sicht) of Dasein within which specific ways of seeing are possible.

Disposition and understanding are also correlative as two aspects of rhetoric. In disposition, we can still hear "dispositio", which meant in the tradition of rhetoric the disposition of a text or speech as the coherence of the different parts of the whole, sometimes called the anatomy of the text, within which the different parts can be distinguished as heading, corpus, branches, foot(notes), etc... (cfr. GADAMER, Rhetorik und Hermeneutik p. 14). And in view (Sicht), we can still see "scopus", the scope, the field of view of a text or speech, in the sense of general purpose which is also taken as the starting-point for the understanding and interpretation of the text or speech (cfr. GADAMER, ibid. p.13).

Understanding forms this circle precisely because the parts can only be understood out of the whole, which is only understood through the agreement of all parts. The understood meaning is widened in concentric circles (GADAMER, *ibid.* p.24).

On the other hand, this circle of understanding takes place in the *Da* as disclosure. The unity of this *Da* still has to be disclosed in two steps: through language and time. The 'gap' in which understanding becomes possible is in hermeneutical philosophy shown to be a space of time. Where before Heidegger, philosophy and hermeneutics wanted to abolish the circle and the space of time between an understanding and a thing understood, Heidegger precisely shows how this gap makes understanding possible for the first time.

Understanding always remains determined by the anticipatory movement of pre-understanding (GADAMER, *ibid.* p.30), and always takes place between strangeness and familiarity (*ibid.* p.32). In this 'space', history first becomes possible together with understanding.

The hermeneutical circle also makes that the judgment or statement (*Urteil*, *Aussage*) becomes problematic as the primary place of truth. Traditional logic, centered around the statement, can grasp only presence-at-hand, but not the mobility of sense (cfr. Pöggeler, *der Denkweg Heideggers* p.77).

Language as a body of prepositions is therefore not taken seriously by Heidegger in *Being and Time*. Language is also the most obscure part of the existential constitution of *Dasein*, and can thus only be cleared last. This analysis starts with 'Rede' as the conversation in which the moods (*Stimmungen*) of disposition are roused and the commonplaces (*topoi*) of understanding are given (cfr. *supra*). *Rede* expresses the formal existential of language.

D. The hermeneutical circle.

It has already been indicated that understanding takes place as disclosure of the Da of Dasein, the between which opens up a place for different ways of understanding, and that this place of understanding is circular.

This hermeneutical circle can be described as a circle between the whole and the parts. Understanding projects forward a sense of the whole as soon as a first sense, a first anticipation of the whole, can be seen in the things encountered (GADAMER, Vom Zirkel des Verstehens, p.27). The sense as anticipation can only be seen out of a pre-project of expectations, a pre-project which can constantly be revised. This revision is possible because the project is not merely an a priori structure, but also an achievement, a construction of the anticipated encounter according to the project (Richardson p.61). This construction is also a way of handling things. Understanding means, to be able to handle things, to know what to do. It is described by Heidegger as the cleaning of the workplace : every thing, every part of the equipment is put on its right place in the whole of the workplace, starting with the clearest things and going further with the more obscure ones, whose place becomes gradually clearer through the clearing of the whole (cfr. SZ p. 148-149). This process shows how the things themselves, through their projected possibilities, can show their place, can be understood in the project of Dasein. They thus indicate the right way to get into the hermeneutical circle (cfr. SZ p. 153).

Chapter III. - Circles of resolution and repetition.

A. The access to resoluteness.

The formal existentials of Dasein have been unfolded in the first section of Being and Time, out of the average everydayness of Dasein, and guided by the idea of existence as the unity of Dasein. When this unity is grasped as care in the sixth chapter of the first section, it still has to be clarified and elaborated by an articulate structure in which the different moments find their place. The second section precisely wants to articulate the existentials of Dasein in authentic moments. Those moments form a repetition (Wiederholung) of moments of average everydayness on the level of authenticity: the characteristics of Dasein are taken up and fulfilled up to such a level.

What interests us here is to see what happens in the repetition of the circles of disclosure. The three moments of this disclosure, disposition, understanding and 'Rede' are opened up in their authentic meaning by three authentic moments of Dasein: dread as a mood of disposition opens up the unity of Dasein as care, the voice of conscience is a form of listening (hören) and thus a mode of logos, linked with secrecy (Verschwiegenheit), and the projection of oneself towards one's own guilt as a mode of projecting understanding (cfr. SZ p. 296). They open up the resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) constituting the authentic existence, the truth (undisclosedness) of the existence of Dasein.

But is resoluteness not also disclosed through a dislocation, just as the pattern of the world as a whole of readiness-to-hand becomes only visible through a loss of one's way ?

The situation in which conscience calls us to project ourselves towards our own guilt is already a situation of fallenness. The Fall is on the one hand always a fall out of the fullness of Being of Dasein, and on the other hand, it is only the fallenness which makes the authentic moments possible through which resoluteness can be disclosed.

Resoluteness requires an engagement in the world, an authentic taking up of the project of oneself and the world, but on the other hand, dread and being-unto-death are precisely moments of taking leave from the world. Moreover, being-unto-death is such a formal criterion that it is not sufficient to give a content to resoluteness.

How does Heidegger solve this paradox ?

Once more, the getting into the circle of authentic Dasein, in this case the disclosure of resoluteness, is only possible through a leap. And this leap is the particular resolution itself : resoluteness exists only as a particular resolution (SZ p. 298), i.e. a decision. This resolution constitutes the proper access to the resoluteness as authentic existence.

B. The resolution resolves.

Heidegger thus leaps into resoluteness through the decision itself. This becomes even clearer in the following sentence : only the resolution itself answers whereunto and wherefore Dasein resolves itself; the resolution itself is the disclosing projection and determination of every factual possibility (SZ p. 298).

The resolution itself opens up the space in which the possibilities first become visible. It is not merely a moment between such possibilities and an action, but the 'between' where they become possible. Only in the decision itself can truth and freedom be realized.

When authentic Dasein is resoluteness, it requires a resolution, it presses for a decision. In the fallenness of our time, since the French revolution, it is absolutely necessary. Heidegger takes up this call of conscience which has also called others in his time and before him. Heidegger himself was clearly inspired by Being and Time by Kierkegaard. And Carl Schmitt, probably one of the thinkers near to Heidegger concerning these questions, refers to the catholic philosophers of the first half of the nineteenth century : Bonald, de Maistre en Donoso Cortes (Marqués de Valdegamas). Their contrarevolutionary political philosophy is characterized by the awareness that this time requires a decision. As their anarchistic enemies, they expressed everywhere that a great alternative forces itself, where mediation is no longer possible. 'No medium', Cardinal Newman said, 'between catholicism and atheism'. All of them formulate a great "either-or" (C. SCHMITT, Politische Theologie p.49). And de Maistre expressed this either-or as ' Je me trouve constamment entre deux abîmes, je marche toujours entre l'être et le néant ' !

It is in the resolution, and first of all in being-unro-death, that Dasein takes up this abyss, takes up nothingness and projects it towards the fullness of possible Being.

C. SCHMITT gives in the same chapter two other characteristics of those philosophers worth mentioning in this context: they were horrified by the liberal idea of an eternal conversation where no decision is taken (ibid.p.49), and they start from the dogma of original sin which accounts for the fallenness of man (ibid.p.51). Heidegger clearly writes in the line of the second one. As to the relation between decision and conversation, this is less clear (Rede = ± conversation).

The analysis of resoluteness in Being an Time is preceded by that of the existential constitution of the Da as disposition, understanding and 'Rede'. It could be said that the leap of the decision is preceded also by the different moods and the different interpretations of disposition and understanding. The 'topoi' or commonplaces can be seen as the thrown possibilities of the project which have to be taken up in deciding upon the project. But Heidegger seems to reject this precisely, as the possibilities are first disclosed and projected in the decision itself (SZ 298). A conversation preceding this decision can only remain fallen and inauthentic.

But Heidegger doesn't speak much about authentic language in Being and Time. What is the relation between resolution and language ? It remains obscure, but the indication is given in par. 74.

Resoluteness discloses the factual possibilities of authentic existence out of the inherited past (SZ p. 383). Free for his death, Dasein gives itself over to such an inherited and also chosen possibility. This is what Heidegger calls Schicksal. This Schicksal becomes only free in the struggle (Kampf - which reminds us another 'Geistesverwandter' of Heidegger, nl. Ernst Jünger -) of a community or nation (Volk) (SZ p. 384).

Is there a contradiction between the decisionism of par. 60 and the traditionalism of par. 74 ? The paradox can maybe be clarified by another remark of C. Schmitt concerning Donoso Cortes, who was a legitimist, but also convinced that the moment of final struggle had come. He considered the monarchy great in its absoluteness, but when there are no kings anymore who are courageous enough to govern otherwise as by the will of the people, then we need a political dictatorship. In the face of radical evil, in the either or between Being and Nothingness, there can only be a dictatorship, and the legitimist idea of inherited succession on the throne becomes an empty pedantry. Maybe, Heidegger was slightly moved by the same tendency from traditionalism to decisionism.

C. The circle of repetition.

Resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) takes up disclosure (Erschlossenheit) on the level of authentic Dasein. In a similar way, the different existentials brought to unity in care, are taken up in an articulate way in the unity of temporality. The second section of the first part of Being and Time gives a repetition of the characteristics of average everydayness in an authentic way. It reconsiders the thrownness of Dasein and takes its fallenness up again. It thus wants to fulfill the circle described in D. of Chapter I.

But the resoluteness itself also stands in need for repetition. The resolution has to be renewed constantly : the authentic life constantly renews itself (cfr. SZ p.308). This is an assuming of one's self and in this way, the achieving of Dasein's authentic past (cfr. SZ p. 339, Richardson p.84). The resoluteness in which Dasein returns to itself discloses the factual possibilities of existence out of the inherited past and gives itself over to them (SZ p.383, cfr. B. of this chapter), and thus forms its fate (Schicksal). When this giving itself over to past possibilities becomes explicit through a return into and taking up of the possibilities of past Dasein, it is called Wiederholung (repetition, retrieve).

This re-trieve is never merely a repetition of past factual Dasein. It is a returning to the original possibilities who have long been hidden (KM p. 185). In the tradition, the historicity of Dasein remains hidden to itself. The possibilities hidden in tradi-

tion can be disclosed as positive possibilities. This requires a 'working loose' (Auflockerung) of the tradition and a dissolution of the hiding of original experience (cfr. SZ p. 20-23). Maybe we could call it a similar process of 'Entmythologisierung' as the one undertaken by Heidegger's friend R. Bultmann in theology (protestant).

The repetition thus discloses the historicity of Dasein and makes it visible. On the other hand, repetition is only possible because Dasein is always already historical (SZ p.386). Another circle similar to earlier ones.

In showing the historicity of Dasein, the repetition and transformation of past possibilities (Wiederholung) precisely widens these possibilities, and thus opens up new possibilities to which Dasein can project itself. This repetition also requires the Dasein to choose his past possibilities. It thus is also a repetition of the decision.

In this choice, Dasein chooses its hero and remains faithful to him, and thus to its own fate. As Pöggeler remarks (Denkweg Heideggers p.143), Heidegger can well be said to have chosen F. NIETZSCHE as its hero, although Being and Time seems to refer more to Christ than to the Antichrist. But Nietzsche is the hero of repetition itself himself. He not only took up all former philosophy to unconceal the possibilities hidden in it, but is also the philosopher of eternal recurrence (ewige Wiederkehr). Still, the choice of Nietzsche could only take place in later works of Heidegger and required the so-called turn, where Being and Time remains ambiguous. The repetition is not yet completely possible, because it requires a deeper destruction of metaphysics than the one undertaken in the first part of Being and Time, still caught in the language of metaphysics. This destructive repetition of

metaphysics, together with a different taking up of the original possibilities covered up by it - namely those of the presocratic philosophers - sets a task which Heidegger starts to carry out from the publication of Being and Time on.

Fourth Chapter. - Holzwege and ;..

Being and Time was never completed. Its second part has been written partly in the writings concerning the history of philosophy and the destruction of metaphysics. The third section of the first part however, on Time and Being, which had to deal with the ontological difference, the return to the origin, and the presencing out of it, remained unfulfilled? The circle of Being and Time between the analysis of Dasein and the meaning of Being itself has thus never been closed, just as the ascension from everydayness to authenticity remains ambiguous.

Being and Time wanted to leap into the clearing in the wood of beings, disclosed by Dasein, and in which the meaning of Being had to appear. However, Heidegger himself decided that the analysis of Dasein didn't disclose the meaning of Being as projected. It led to different interpretations and developments, but not to the clearing. The question of Being required another path. The attempts to find such a way (in 1936-1950) were i.a. collected in "Holzwege" under the dedication:

Holz lautet ein alter Name für Wald. Im Holz sind Wege, die meist verwachsen jäh im Umbe-gangene aufhören. Sie heißen Holzwege.

Jeder verläuft gesondert, aber im selber Wald. Oft scheint es, als gleiche einer dem anderen. Doch es scheint nur so. Holzmacher und Wald-hüter kennen die Wege. Sie wissen, was es heißt auf einem Holzweg zu sein.

Holzwege are usually dead-ended, but sometimes they arrive at a clearing. Most of them however, are covered, forgotten as they are.

In being and Time, Heidegger wanted to take a leap into the clearing. Here, he recognizes that a path is needed. Being and Time asked the right questions, but followed only one of those paths (SZ p. 436 in the last par.), and probably got lost in the wood, because the paths were covered. The analysis of Dasein therefore found a dead end. The destruction of metaphysics wants to clear some of the original paths from the wilderness bewildering them. A new search first has to recognize this wild growing and give an account for the ground of the clearing. Heidegger therefore introduces the word 'Earth' as opposed to 'world', in his essay on the origin of the work of art (in Holzwege).

Starting in circles (p. 7-8), the essay tries different ways of access, and finds this access only in the work of art itself as opening up a world and putting it back on earth.

Earth repeats the greek 'phusis', and as 'phusis' is linked with 'phuein', to grow, earth is linked with

images of the wood of beings, which grows on it, covers and obscures it, but also makes a clearing possible. In the struggle between world and earth, instigated by the work of art, truth as unconcealment can become present and be fixed in a 'Gestalt', a figure or stature of truth. The work of art is thus the place of truth, its primary 'Ort', and especially some poems are the exquisite place of truth.

In opening up a world and replacing it on earth, the work of art assigns man a place in the wood of beings and shows the access to it. The earth gives a ground to Dasein, so that his decision no longer stands above an abyss.

The great poets especially indicate this access. They call upon us to return to our home, where we are at home, to return to the Heimatn which is nearness to and neighbourhood of the Origin (Erl. zu Hölderlin p.23).

In Being and Time, the authentic moments of Dasein where only thematized by a dislocation and a leap. Dasein is after all not at home in the world, although thrown in it, but displaced (Heimatvertrieben). It is our task to return to the earth and the nearness of the origin.

Wiederkehren kann nur, wer vordem und vielleicht schon eine lange Zeit hindurch als der Wanderer die Last der Wanderung auf die Schulter genommen hat und hinübe gegangen ist zum Ursprung, damit er dort erfahre, was das Zu-Suchende sei, um dann als der Suchende erfahrener zurückzukommen.

(Erl. zu Hölderlin p.23).